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Abstract
Often it is maintained that economic freedom may further high levels of economic growth. This paper compares
various indicators for economic freedom. It is concluded that although these measures differ somewhat in their
coverage, they show similar rankings for the countries covered. Some elements in these measures are, however,
questionable. The robustness of the relationship between freedom and growth is also examined. Our main
conclusion is that more economic freedom fosters economic growth. 
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2"I believe that free societies have arisen and persisted only because
economic freedom is so much more productive economically than other
methods of controlling economic activity." (Milton Friedman, Foreword in
Gwartney et al., 1996).
1. Introduction
Cultural norms and institutions are often believed to explain why certain countries grow rich and others remain
poor (Landes, 1998). One important question in this regard is the role of economic freedom. What connection, if
any, is there between economic development and economic liberties? Liberals think that the demise of socialism
and of old, state-led, import-substitution models of development will bring faster, more sustained growth to
countries that keep (or make) their economies free. Others argue that state control, if intelligently applied, can
boost growth. This debate has been bedeviled by two things. First, a lack of any clear definition of what is meant
by economic freedom, and of how to measure it. Second, a lack of data that applies this definition across a wide
enough range of countries and over a long enough stretch of time to test credibly whether there is a correlation
between freedom and prosperity. 
Over the last decade or so, this situation has gradually changed. A number of indicators for economic
freedom have become available and they have subsequently been applied in empirical growth models. What is
missing, so far, is a thorough comparison and evaluation of these indicators. That is the first aim of the present
paper. We focus on two indicators that have attracted considerable attention recently, i.e. the indicator of the
Fraser Institute and that of the Heritage Foundation/Wall Street Journal. The reason for choosing these indicators
is that they are available for a wide range of countries for a large number of years and that they are comparable.
Although we focus on these indicators, in reviewing the literature we will also mention other attempts.
The second aim is to review and extend the empirical evidence on the relationship between economic
freedom and economic development. A serious problem here is that economic theory does not provide enough
guidance with respect to the proper specification of the empirical model. The so-called extreme bound analysis
of Leamer (1983) and Levine and Renelt (1992) is therefore often used to examine how  robust the variable of
interest - in our case a measure of economic freedom - is related to economic growth. Sali-i-Martin (1997)
recently argued that the test applied in the extreme bound analysis is too strong for any variable to really pass it.
Instead of analyzing the extreme bounds of the estimates of the coefficient of a particular variable, Sali-i-Martin
suggests to analyze the entire distribution. He concludes that the picture emerging from the empirical growth
literature is not the pessimistic "Nothing is Robust" that we get with the extreme bound analysis. Instead, he
finds that a substantial number of variables can be found to be strongly related to growth. The present paper
applies both approaches to the relationship between economic freedom and economic growth.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the contents of the indicators
that we focus on, while section 3 shows their correlation. Section 4 reviews previous studies on the relationship
between economic freedom and economic growth, while section 5 presents our estimation results. The final
3section offers some concluding comments. 
2. Review of indicators
Economic theory indicates that economic freedom affects incentives, productive effort, and the effectiveness of
resource use. Indeed, since the time of Adam Smith, if not before, economists and economic historians have
argued that the freedom to choose and supply resources, competition in business, trade with others and secure
property rights are central ingredients for economic progress (see e.g. North and Thomas, 1973). The new
growth theory boosted interest in this issue. A number of recent empirical studies suggest that economic freedom
may be important in explaining cross-country differences in economic performance (De Vanssay and Spindler,
1994; Alesina, 1998; De Haan and Siermann, 1998; Nelson and Singh, 1998). 
Still, it is not always clear what authors mean if they write about economic freedom. We start with the
definition as provided by Gwartney et al. (1996): Individuals have economic freedom when (a) property they
acquire without the use of force, fraud, or theft is protected from physical invasions by others, and (b) they are
free to use, exchange, or give their property to another as long as their actions do not violate the identical rights
of others.  On the basis of this definition, an index of economic freedom should measure the extent to which1
rightly acquired property is protected and individuals are free to engage in voluntary transactions. In an
economically free society, the fundamental function of government is the protection of private property and the
enforcement of contracts. When a government fails to protect private property, takes property itself without full
compensation or establishes restrictions that limit voluntary exchange, it violates the economic freedom of its
citizens. Institutional arrangements that restrain trade, increase transaction costs, weaken property rights, and
create uncertainty will reduce the realization of gains from trade and also the incentive of individuals to engage
in productive activities.
Gwartney et al. (1996) argue that it is important to distinguish economic freedom from political and
civil liberties. Political liberty is present when citizens are free to participate in the political process (vote, lobby,
and choose among candidates), elections are fair and competitive, and alternative parties are allowed to
participate freely. Civil liberty encompasses the freedom of the press and the rights of individuals to assemble,
hold alternative religious views, receive a fair trial and express their views without fear of physical retaliation.
Gwartney et al. (1996) argue that a country may be liberal in a political sense - that is, be highly democratic
while the major civil liberties are protected - and still adopt policies that conflict with economic freedom. 
A different view has been put forward by Freedom House. Wright (1982, pp. 51-52), for instance,
argues: "To examine economic freedom is to assess the degree to which persons are free individually and
collectively to undertake economic activities of their choice, regardless of political structure. Collectively, a
fundamental aspect of this freedom is the extent to which the economic system that controls choice reflects the
expressed preferences of the majority of the citizenry rather than those of a ruling few....In those societies that
guarantee effective participation by the citizenry in the political decision-making process, the nature of the
economic system is most likely to reflect the preferences of a majority of the groups in society for certain
economic arrangements and relationships....Economic freedoms existing within a democratic political
framework may be called legitimated or voter-approved economic freedoms, reflecting the participatory and
4legitimating process by which the range and limits of economic activities are established." In the reasoning of
Freedom House there is thus a substantial difference between the degree to which people are free individually
and collectively to undertake economic activities. Individual freedom means the right to pursue economic
activities free from arbitrary control and interference by the state and other individuals. Collective freedom refers
to the extent to which the economic system that controls choice reflects the expressed preferences of the majority
of the citizenry rather than those of a ruling few. Rabushka (1991c, p. 61) rejects this line of reasoning: "Wright’s
definition of collective economic freedom ... is not a statement about some collective economic right that exists
apart from the sum of the rights enjoyed by all the individuals in any society. This concept of collective
economic freedom has no foundation in the classical liberal tradition of John Locke and Adam Smith. It
represents a complete departure from the premise of methodological individualism in favour of group action." As
we will show below, this issue is of crucial importance with respect to certain elements to be taken into account
in the construction of an indicator of economic freedom.2
Given a general definition the next step is to decide on the elements that should be included in constructing a
proper indicator. Table 1 compares two well known recent indicators in this respect.  A detailed examination3
may be useful, as it is a way of gaining a more sophisticated understanding of what is meant by economic
freedom.  
5Table 1 A comparison of two indicators of economic freedom
Aspect: Fraser Institute (Gwartney et al., 1996) Heritage Foundation/Wall
Street Journal (Holmes et al., 1998)
International trade 1. Taxes on international trade; 2. Size of a 1. Level of tariff and ntb’s and corruption in the
country’s trade relative to potential customs service
International capital 3. Restrictions on capital flows 2. Restrictions on Capital flows and Foreign In-
flows vestment
Black market 4. Differences between an official exchange 3. Presence of black market in general
rate and black-market rate
Taxes 5. Top marginal tax rates (and income 4. Taxation: Rates of Income Tax (top rate and rate
threshold at which it applies); 6. Is there that applies to average income) and Profit Taxes
conscription?
Government 7. Public consumption spending as a share of 5. Government intervention in the economy mea-
intervention GDP; 8. Subsidies and transfer payments as a sured by government consumption share, government
share of GDP; 9. The role and presence of ownership of business and output produced by
state-operated enterprises government
Monetary policy and 10. Volatility of inflation; 11. Monetary 6. Average Inflation 
inflation growth rate 
Banking 12. Citizens’ rights to hold foreign-currency 7. Freedom in banking, including restrictions on
accounts domestically; 13. Citizens’ rights to foreign banks and government regulation and ow-
hold bank account abroad  nership
Price controls and 14. Price controls; 15. Controls on borrowing 8. Wage and price controls (including minimum
regulation and Market and lending rates; 16. Freedom to compete in wage laws, price controls, government subsidies); 9.
entry markets (only in latest versions) Government regulation concerning undertaking of
certain activities (licensing requirements, corruption
in the bureaucracy, labour regulations, environmental
and safety regulations)
Property rights 17. Equality of citizens under law and access 10. Property rights: including freedom from go-
to judiciary (only in latest versions) vernment influence over judicial system, expropria-
tion, corruption within judiciary
6The indicator of the Heritage Foundation/Wall Street Journal (Holmes et al., 1998) takes 10 elements into
account: trade policy, taxation, government intervention in the economy, monetary policy, foreign investment,
banking, wage and price controls, property rights and black market activity. Under every heading a number of
questions (a total of 50) is asked on the basis of which the score - running from 1 (most free) to 5 (least free) -
for the aspect concerned is given. The unweighted average of all 10 elements constitutes the economic freedom
rating of that country. 
Gwartney et al. (1996) choose 17 measures and rate a high number of countries on each of these
measures on a scale of 0-10, in which zero means that a country is completely unfree and ten means it is
completely free. The measures are in four broad areas: Money and inflation; Government operations and
regulations; "Takings" and discriminatory taxation; and International exchange. These 17 measures are combined
in three ways in aggregated rankings. In the first Index (Ie) each component is assigned a weight equal to the
inverse of its standard deviation, while in the Index Is1 the importance of the components is based on a survey
under experts in the field of economic freedom. Finally, in the Index Is2 the weighing is also based on a survey,
but this time the survey was held under a number of country experts. These indicators are available for 1975,
1980, 1985, 1990, and 1995 and for more recent years (see Gwartney et al., 1996). As they are available for a
large number of countries for quite a long period, we have used these indicators in our empirical work. In the
remainder of this section we therefore focus our discussion on the Fraser Institute indicator. As follows from
Table 1, both the Fraser Institute and Heritage Foundation/Wall Street Journal indicators are, however, very
similar. So much of the conceptual discussion also applies to the indicator of the Heritage Foundation/Wall
Street Journal.
Gwartney et al. argue that taxes on international trade limit the freedom of domestic residents to trade
with foreigners. Many nations restrain trade through the use of quotas, monopoly grants, and various other types
of discriminatory regulations. These measures are every bit as much a violation of economic freedom as tariffs,
export duties, and exchange rate controls. Gwartney et al. devised an indirect method designed to approximate
their severity, using regression analysis to estimate the expected size of the trade sector for each country, given
its geographic size, population, and location relative to potential trading partners. If the actual size of a country’s
trade sector as a share of GDP was significantly smaller than expected, this is consistent with the view that its
trade sector was reduced as the result of quotas and other regulatory restraints. Exchange rate controls often
make it difficult for people to trade with outsiders. The black market premium indicates how severe these
restrictions may be.
As follows from table 1, Gwartney et al. also take government taxes and spending into account in their
economic freedom measure. They argue (pp. 29-30): "When a government plays favourites - when it takes from
one group in order to make transfers to others or when it imposes the costs of public services disproportionately
on various groups - the government becomes an agent of plunder. Such actions conflict with economic freedom.
This is equally true whether the policies are undertaken by a dictatorial political leader or a legislative
majority..... When governments tax income from one person in order to transfer it to another, they are denying
individuals the fruits of their labours.... High marginal tax rates discriminate against productive citizens and deny
them the fruits of their labour. In essence, such rates seize wealth from taxpayers without providing them an
7equivalent increase in service." Similarly, Gwartney et al. argue that, in essence, military conscription denies
draftees the property right to their labour services. While national defense is an acceptable activity for a
"protective and productive" state, the cost of that protection should be imposed on all citizens. Singling out a
specific group to pay for something that benefits all is a clear "taking" and a discriminatory form of taxation. As
Milton Friedman (1962, p. 36) puts it: "There is no justification for not paying whatever is necessary to attract
the requested number of men." 
Economic freedom is also said to be reduced due to state enterprises: "Government-operated enterprises ...
involve the substitution of political coercion for market decision-making." (Gwartney et al., 1996, p. 23). 
Monetary disturbances and unexpected inflation changes the value of money and thereby threaten
economic freedom. Therefore, Gwartney et al. include the money supply (in excess of the growth rate of
potential GDP) and the standard deviation of annual inflation during the last five years as part of their empirical
measure of economic freedom. When citizens have the freedom to maintain bank accounts in foreign currencies
or abroad, it is easier for them to avoid the uncertainties accompanying an unstable domestic monetary regime.
Price controls interfere with the freedom of buyers and sellers to undertake exchanges even though the
terms of trade are mutually agreeable. Price controls also, in effect, take property from a private owner. The
impact of credit market regulations, interest rate controls, and government operation of the banking system on
the freedom of citizens to borrow and lend.
Governments often require licenses and/or impose other restraints that limit the entry of firms into
various business activities and of individuals into various occupations.
A legal structure that clearly defines property rights, enforces contracts, and provides a mutually
agreeable mechanism for the settlement of contractual and property right disputes provides the foundation for a
free economy. 
A number of critical remarks are in order here. First, should the level of taxes be included? Of course, taxes
always distort prices, but that in itself does not make it necessary to include the level of taxation in an index of
economic freedom. So the argumentation of the Heritage Foundation/Wall Street Journal is ill-founded, where it
is simply stated that all taxes are harmful to economic activity because a tax essentially is a government-imposed
disincentive to perform the activity being taxed. In line with the definition of Gwartney et al. (1996) one line of
argument would be that if the tax system was agreed upon voluntarily, the level of taxes does not restrict
freedom. In real life, of course, decisions as such are not based on unanimity. This brings us back to the approach
of Wright, who stresses majority voting as the crucial issue. However, Gwartney et al. (1996) are heading in
another direction, which seems more in line with the view put forward by Rothbard in which the key feature that
distinguishes the state from private persons and groups is that the former obtains its revenue by coercion, known
as taxation, whereas the latter obtain their income voluntarily by selling goods and services to others or by
voluntary gift. To Rothbard, taxation is theft, pure and simple. As Rabushka (1991b) puts it: "A Rothbardian
rating of economic freedom would be the simplest measure to construct: it would rest solely on the extent to
which all resources in any economy are held in the form of valid property titles and are subject to voluntary
exchange with no interference by the state. Since every country in the world has some state interference in the
economy, a rating scheme based on Rothbard’s libertarian vision is more Utopian than practical. Every other
8philosopher of economic freedom, from John Locke to Adam Smith to Milton Friedman to Robert Nozick, grants
specific, if limited, powers to government or the state, including the power to tax, enforce laws, maintain order,
and defend the nation. Rating schemes based on these alternative conceptions of economic freedom would
permit larger measures of government activity. They would also take into account the real world activities of
governments." This, of course, implies that these necessary government functions have to be financed. The
question then becomes what level of taxes (spending) is acceptable (i.e. does not reduce freedom)? Surprisingly
enough, Gwartney et al. themselves also seem to defend this line of argument, as they state (p. 22): "There are
two broad functions of government that are consistent with economic freedom: (1) protection of individuals and
their property against invasions by intruders, both domestic and foreign and (2) provision of a few select goods -
what economists call public goods - which have characteristics that make them difficult for private business
firms to produce and market.... When governments move beyond these protective and productive functions into
the provision of private goods, they restrict consumer choice and economic freedom." In constructing their
economic freedom indicator, they simply forget these nuances and just focus on levels of taxes and spending. Of
course this is not to argue that taxes are not important and that a high level of taxation is irrelevant for economic
growth, but we doubt whether it should be included in this way in an empirical measure of economic freedom. In
a more practical vein, we also consider it improper to simply take tax rates into account as e.g. Holmes et al.
(1998) do, since the actual tax burden also depends on other features of the tax system, like tax allowances and
other factors determining tax payments (like deductions).
A similar argument can be raised against inclusion of government consumption in an index of economic
freedom. Although there is some evidence suggesting that a high level of government consumption may hamper
economic growth (see e.g. Barro, 1991; Alesina, 1998) it is doubtful whether the level of government
consumption spending should be part of the concept of economic freedom.  4
Second, the way monetary policy is taken up in some of these indicators also raises some questions. For
one thing, many authors have argued that inflation is a tax and should be treated as such. Like every other tax it
has distortive effects and optimal policy would be to choose such a tax mix that its distortive effects are minimal
(Mankiw, 1987). So the same argument made with respect to other forms of taxation apply here as well. Again,
this is not to argue that inflation as such may not be detrimental. Indeed, there are various studies suggesting that
it is (Fischer, 1993; Barro 1995). However, if decisions have been taken in such a way that the preferences of the
majority of the citizenry are expressed, it becomes questionable whether an inflation rate of 8% say is different
from an inflation rate of 5% as is the case in the Heritage Foundation/Wall Street Journal index. 
Another objection to the inclusion of both inflation (or money growth) and the standard deviation of
inflation is that inflation variability is positively correlated with the level of inflation (Chowdhury, 1991). 
93. An empirical analysis of various indicators
In this section we compare the different measures of economic freedom and their underlying indexes. As we do
not know the probability distribution function from which these indexes are drawn, we use two concepts of
nonparametric or rank correlation to compare the different measures of economic freedom. i.e. the Spearman
rank-order correlation coefficient (r ), and Kendall’s correlation coefficient (r ).  s k 5
We will first compare the economic freedom indicators of the Fraser Institute and the Heritage
Foundation/Wall Street Journal. In order to be able to compare them, we take 1995 as our benchmark. For this
year both institutes have published their rankings for comparable groups of countries. As the Fraser Institute
presents three different indicators all based on the same underlying measures, we are in fact comparing four
indicators. The differences between the three indicators of the Fraser institute stem from different weighing
schemes used to aggregate the underlying components into one measure. For instance, to calculate Fraser’s
Equal Impact Index (Ie) each of the 17 components discussed in the previous section is assigned a weight equal
to the inverse of its standard deviation. The two Survey Indexes of the Fraser Institute (Is1 and Is2) are based on
weights given by some experts in the field (see section 2 for further details). Table 2 reports the outcomes of the
Spearman and Kendall rank-order correlation test.  The upper-right part of the table displays the Spearman6
correlation coefficients, the lower-left part reveals the ones from Kendall. As expected, the correlations between
the different Fraser indexes are quite high. However, their correlations with the Heritage index are rather low; in
absolute value they never exceed 0.8. Still, all correlations are significantly different from zero at a 1 percent
level.
Table 2 Nonparametric correlations between two indicators of economic freedom, 1995
Kendall \ Spearman 1 2 3 4 
1 Fraser’s Equal Impact Index 1 0.97 0.98 -0.74 
2 Fraser’s Survey Index 1 0.89 1 0.92 -0.68 
3 Fraser’s Survey Index 2 0.91 0.78 1 -0.77 
4 Heritage’s Score -0.59 -0.52 -0.61 1 
Let us now take a somewhat more closer look at the underlying components of the Fraser indexes. Table 3
compares the four broad categories which Gwartney et al. (1996) define and the three resulting summary
indicators. The structure of the table is as before. Bold figures indicate that the correlation is not significantly
different from zero at at least a 1 percent level. The category ‘Takings and Discriminatory Taxation’ catches the
eye: neither with any other category nor with the resulting indicators is there a significant correlation. 
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Table 3 Nonparametric correlations between the economic freedom indicators and their underlying broad
categories of the Fraser Institute (Gwartney et al.), 1995 (102 observations)
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Kendall \ Spearman
1 Money and Inflation 1 0.60 0.71 0.84 0.75 0.88 -0.13 
2 Government Operations 0.43 1 0.61 0.86 0.84 0.81 0.04 
3 Takings 1 -0.10 0.02 -0.18 0.03 0.21 -0.04 
4 International Sector 0.53 0.45 1 0.82 0.76 0.85 -0.14 
5 Equal Impact Index 0.67 0.69 0.65 1 0.97 0.98 0.03 
6 Survey Index 1 0.57 0.68 0.57 0.89 1 0.92 0.15 
7 Survey Index 2 0.71 0.64 0.68 0.91 0.78 1 -0.03 
Bold: not significant at at least a 1 percent level.
In Table 4 we check the correlations between all components and the three indicators of the Fraser Institute. To
save space we only report the Spearman rank-order correlation coefficients. First looking at the category
‘Takings’ reveals that - except for just one case - there is no significant positive relationship between its compo-
nents and the economic freedom indicators. Furthermore, government consumption and the size of the trade
sector seem to be unrelated to economic freedom.
Table 4 Nonparametric correlations between the economic freedom indicators and their underlying
components of the Fraser Institute (Gwartney et al.), 1995 (102 observations)
Spearman                    Ie                Is1               Is2 No. of Obs.
Money and Inflation
Money Expansion (11) 0.43 0.33 0.45 102 
Inflation Variability (10) 0.59 0.52 0.59 102 
Foreign Currency Accounts (12) 0.63 0.59 0.68 102 
Deposits Abroad (13) 0.72 0.69 0.76 102 
Government Operations
Government Consumption (7) 101 0.01 0.14 -0.11 
Government Enterprises (9) 0.58 0.62 0.53 102 
Price Controls (14) 0.70 0.62 0.71 88 
Entry into Business (16) 0.75 0.72 0.76 102 
Equality Under the Law (17) 0.60 0.49 0.65 102 
Credit Market (15) 0.67 0.58 0.64 84 
Takings
Transfers & Subsidies (8) -0.38 75 -0.24 0.01 
Marginal Tax Rates (5) 0.35 82 0.13 0.05 
Conscription (6) 102 0.04 0.10 0.03 
International Sector
Trade Taxes (1) 0.57 0.44 0.63 66 
Exchange Rate Controls (4) 0.69 0.62 0.72 102 
Exp. Size of Trade Sector (2) 100 0.17 0.13 0.17 
Capital Restraints (3) 0.82 0.77 0.85 102 
Bold: not significant at at least a 1 percent level. Numbers in parentheses refer to the numbering in table 1.
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Finally, we take a look at the economic freedom indicator of the Heritage Foundation. Table 5 displays the
correlations between all ten components and the resulting indicator. As we only have detailed information for
1997, the data refer to this year. Again the issue of taxation shows the lowest correlation with the other
components of economic freedom.
On the basis of the foregoing analysis we have constructed our own preferred indicators of economic
freedom by not including the following aspects: money expansion, government consumption, transfers and
subsidies, marginal tax rates and conscription. The correlation coefficients between our new indicators and the
original ones are: 0.80 for Is1, 0.91 for Ie, and 0.97 for Is2. In the remainder of the paper we will focus on the
original indicators, but all estimates have also been redone using our preferred indicators. The basic conclusions
are not dependent on the choice of the economic freedom indicator.
Table 5 Nonparametric correlations between the economic freedom indicator and its underlying
components of the Heritage Foundation, 1997 (149 observations)
Kendall \ Spearman 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1 Trade (1) 1 0.31 0.49 0.51 0.46 0.59 0.54 0.53 0.68 0.08 0.14 
2 Taxation (4) 1 0.25 0.22 0.07 -0.04 0.15 0.20 0.16 0.11 0.13 0.08 
3 Government Intervention (5) 0.27 0.21 1 0.40 0.43 0.43 0.40 0.38 0.27 0.53 0.19 
4 Monetary Policy (6) 0.16 1 0.27 0.50 0.38 0.48 0.56 0.11 -0.04 0.18 0.18 
5 Foreign Investment (2) 0.43 0.35 0.15 1 0.62 0.59 0.56 0.49 0.47 0.66 0.12 
6 Banking (7) 0.44 0.17 0.38 0.23 0.56 1 0.72 0.61 0.57 0.60 0.77 
7 Wages/Prices (8) 0.40 0.38 0.16 0.54 0.65 1 0.56 0.58 0.57 0.71 0.14 
8 Property Rights (10) 0.50 0.35 0.43 0.50 0.54 0.49 1 0.73 0.80 0.88 0.09 
9 Regulation (9) 0.47 0.33 0.32 0.44 0.51 0.52 0.66 1 0.66 0.80 0.11 
10 Black Market (3) 0.45 0.23 0.41 0.40 0.51 0.50 0.71 0.58 1 0.84 0.06 
11 1997 Score 0.55 0.17 0.43 0.44 0.55 0.64 0.59 0.77 0.68 0.71 1 
Bold: not significant at at least a 1 percent level. Numbers in parentheses refer to the numbering in table 1.
4. Review of previous empirical studies
This section reviews previous attempts to analyze the correlation between economic freedom and economic
growth. 
Barro (1994) employs the black market premium on foreign exchange as a proxy for governmental dis-
tortions of markets more generally. Its coefficient in a growth model estimated for about 100 countries is
significantly negative, thereby suggesting that distortions of markets are adverse for economic growth. One may,
however, doubt whether the black market premium is a proper indicator for lack of economic freedom.
Furthermore, a thorough sensitivity analysis is lacking in this study. Alesina (1998) also uses the black market
premium. In addition he employs data provided by Knack and Keefer (1995) on corruption, risk of expropriation,
repudiation of contracts and the rule of law. All indicators (put under the heading of bureaucratic quality and rule
of law) generally affect economic growth, but a sensitivity analysis is lacking.
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Using a ranking of economic freedom constructed by Scully and Slottje (1991), De Vanssay and
Spindler (1994) find a positive relationship between economic growth and this measure of economic freedom.
However, they do not check whether their conclusion is sensitive with respect to the measure of economic liberty
chosen. Furthermore, they do not apply some kind of sensitivity analysis to check whether conclusions are robust
with respect to the specification of their model. De Haan and Siermann (1998) have applied the extreme bound
analysis using all variants of the Scully-Slottje index. They find that the link between economic freedom and
economic growth depends upon the measure used: for some variants of the Scully-Slottje index of economic
freedom there appears a robust direct relationship, while for others there is no such relationship. These findings
point to a serious problem, as all the measures are constructed as some combination of indicators for various
aspects of economic freedom. Furthermore, the correlation with the Scully-Slottje indices and the indicators for
economic freedom of Gwartney et al. (1996) is strikingly low. Although it is often argued that economic freedom
will stimulate investment, De Haan and Siermann conclude that investment is not related to the Scully-Slottje
measures for economic freedom.
Torstensson (1994) has also analyzed the impact of economic freedom on the growth performance using
data for the period 1976-85 covering 68 countries. Two aspects of property rights are considered in this study.
The first variable attempts to capture the degree to which property is state-owned and the other variable attempts
to capture whether individuals are safe from arbitrary seizure of their property. Torstensson (1994) finds that the
degree of state ownership does not seem to affect growth rates. However, arbitrary seizure of property affects
growth negatively. A serious drawback of this study is the limited concept of economic freedom used, as well the
absence of a thorough sensitivity analysis.
Although Gwartney et al. (1996) do not estimate growth models, these authors find that the countries
with the highest ratings in terms of economic freedom in 1993-95, achieved an average annual growth rate of per
capita real GDP of 2.4% during 1980-94. In contrast, the average annual growth of per capita real GDP for the
27 countries with the lowest ratings was minus 1.3% over the same period. No country with a persistently high
economic freedom rating during the two recent decades failed to achieve a high level of income. Also
improvements in economic freedom help according to these authors, as all 17 countries which improved their
economic freedom significantly experienced positive growth rates.
Nelson and Singh (1998) use economic freedom as control variable in their model on the relationship
between economic growth and political freedom. Their study refers to the 1970-89 period and includes 67
developing countries. The measure of economic freedom used is based on price stability, government size,
discriminatory taxation and trade restrictions. The authors conclude that economic freedom excercises a
significantly positive effect on economic growth. Again, a sensitivity analysis is lacking.
Finally, Beach and Davis (1998) report a positive correlation between economic growth over the period
1980-93 and the value of the Heritage Foundation/Wall Street Journal index for 1997. Apart from not including
control variables, a more serious shortcoming is that the index and the estimation period do not refer to (more or
less) the same sample period.
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5. New evidence
Using the variant of the extreme bound analysis of Levine and Renelt (1992) and Leamer (1983) we analyze in
this section the robustness of the relationship between economic freedom and economic growth.  We focus on7
the sample period 1975-1990 as both the indicators of economic freedom of Gwartney et al. (1996) and a large
number of variables to be included in the growth regressions are available for a considerable number of
countries. Growth equations of the following general form have been estimated:
)Y = "M  + $F  + (Z  + u  (1)i i i i i
where the subscript refers to country i; )Y  is the average growth of per capita GDP of country i; M  is a vectori i
of standard economic explanatory variables, which according to previous empirical studies have shown to be
robustly linked with economic growth; F  is an indicator of economic freedom in country i; Z is a vector of up toi
three possible additional economic explanatory variables, which according to the literature may be related to
economic growth; and u  is an error term. i
The data on the average growth rate of GDP per capita are taken from the Summers and Heston data file (version
5.6) as described in Summers and Heston (1991). The basic set of economic variables in the M vector consists
of: initial income in US-dollars; average investment share to GDP - both from the Summers and Heston (SH)
data file - and secondary-school enrollment in 1975, which is taken from the Barro-Lee (BL) data set. These
three variables were chosen on the basis of the findings of Levine and Renelt (1992). The additional economic
variables in the Z vector are: average population growth (POP; SH); the average ratio of real government
consumption to GDP (GOV; SH); the average inflation rate (INF; SH) and the average ratio of export and import
to GDP (OPEN; SH). Population growth is added to the regression as it has been suggested that this factor may
enhance growth (see Baumol et al., 1989). The ratio of government consumption to GDP is taken up because
Barro (1991), among others, included this variable in his growth equations. Barro (1991) finds that government
consumption has a significant negative effect. The inflation rate is added because Fischer (1993) and Barro
(1995) find it to be robustly correlated with growth. Openness is taken up since some economists have claimed
that open economics grow faster, because of higher efficiency gains (see e.g. Feder, 1982 and Romer, 1989). The
variables inflation and government spending are also included because of the critique concerning the inclusion of
these type of variables in indicators of economic freedom as raised section 2. If it can be shown that even if these
variables are included in the growth regression the coefficient of economic freedom remains significant, this
would strengthen the view that economic growth really matters for economic growth.8
Equation 2 presents the estimation results for the basic model. The standard errors in the regression are based on
White’s (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix. The dependent variable )Y  is the average7590
growth rate of GDP per capita over the period 1975-1990. In line with most previous research, the coefficients of
all variables are significantly different from zero. 
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)Y  = 0.10 - 0.016 YCAP  + 0.003 INV  + 0.0004 SEC  (2)7590 75 7590 75
(3.03)  (-3.23)            (4.73)            (1.68)
adj.R  = 0.292
Note: White t-values are shown in parentheses.
A problem that always plagues analyses like the one in the present paper is causality and endogeneity (see e.g.
Paldam, 1998). To ensure that the problem of causality is minimal, we have estimated models for two indicators
of economic freedom: the level in 1975 (the beginning of our estimation period) and the change in economic
freedom over 1975-1990 (our estimation period). As it is possible that the latter variable is endogenous, we have
first performed a test as suggested by Maddala (1992). This test involves running regressions for the change in
economic freedom indicators using as regressors all the determinants of GDP growth plus other variables that are
relevant in explaining our economic freedom indicators (see also Nelson and Singh, 1998). Next, the predicted
values for the change in economic freedom indicators are added to the regression. If its coefficient is
insignificant, the endogeneity hypothesis is rejected. We find that in all cases the change in economic freedom
can be regarded as an exogenous variable according to this test.  9
Table 6 shows the results of the sensitivity analysis using the 1975 level of the economic freedom indicators
outlined in section 2 for 80 countries.  Table 7 shows the results if we use the change in economic freedom10
between 1975-90. For each indicator the outcomes using the three ‘basic’ variables and adding the freedom
measure are given in the row labelled "base". As there are three indicators employed (Ie, Is1 and Is2), there are
three base regressions. In the rows labelled "high" and "low" the maximum spread of the coefficients of the
economic freedom indicators is shown if some vector Z is added as a set of additional explanatory variable(s).
As explained before, this vector is constructed using a combination of up to three of the following variables:
average population growth (POP); the average ratio of real government consumption to GDP (GOV); the
average inflation rate (INF) and the average ratio of export and import to GDP (OPEN). It is also indicated
which additional variables in the regression produced the highest and lowest values of the coefficient,
respectively. 
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Table 6 Sensitivity Results for Fraser Institute Indices for Level of Freedom 1975 (Dependent Variable:
Growth Rate of Real Per Capita GDP 1975-1990)




Ie fragile      
high  0.040  1.41 0.38 POP, INF
base  0.023  0.79 0.29
low -0.000 -0.01 0.35 GOV, INF, OPEN
Is1 fragile
high 0.041  1.45 0.38 POP, INF
base  0.026  0.89 0.30
low  0.001  0.05 0.36 GOV, OPEN
Is2 fragile
high  0.030  1.33 0.37 POP, INF   
base  0.014  0.61 0.29
low -0.001 -0.08 0.36 GOV, OPEN   
It follows from table 6 that the level of economic freedom in 1975 is not robustly related to economic growth.
The coefficient of the level of economic freedom is generally insignificant and sometimes even changes signs,
which lead us to the conclusion that the relationship is fragile. This conclusion also holds if we use our preferred
indicators of economic freedom as outlined in section 3 (not shown). However, table 7 shows that the change in
economic freedom is robustly related to economic growth. Table 8 shows the results for our preferred indicators.
Again the relationship between the change in economic freedom and economic growth is robust, albeit that both
the estimated coefficients and their significance is substantially lower.
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Table 7 Sensitivity Results for Fraser Institute Indices for Increase in the Level of Freedom 1975-90 (Dep-
endent Variable: Growth Rate of Real Per Capita GDP 1975-1990)





high 0.080 4.65 0.43 OPEN, INF
base 0.079 4.20 0.37  
low 0.055 2.82 0.47 GOV, POP, OPEN
Is1 robust
high 0.070 3.55 0.40 OPEN, INF
base 0.069 3.25 0.34
low 0.044 2.04 0.45 POP, GOV, OPEN
Is2 robust
high 0.068 4.43 0.42 INF, OPEN       
base 0.066 3.92 0.37
low 0.046 2.52 0.46 GOV, POP, OPEN
Table 8 Sensitivity Results for Corrected Fraser Institute Indices for Increase in the Level of Freedom
1975-90 (Dependent Variable: Growth Rate of Real Per Capita GDP 1975-1990)





high 0.066 4.43 0.44 OPEN
base 0.063 3.85 0.37  
low 0.044 2.24 0.37 GOV, POP, INF
Is1 robustc
high 0.065 4.15 0.42 OPEN, INF
base 0.059 3.35 0.35
low 0.038 1.81 0.37 POP, GOV
Is2 robustc
high 0.055 3.97 0.42 OPEN       
base 0.052 3.52 0.35
low 0.034 1.96 0.37 GOV, POP
Note: the economic freedom indicators are corrected for items that we find suspect. See section 4 for a further explanation.
One possible objection towards our analysis so far could be that the choice of our sample of countries, although
only based on data availability, may have influenced our results. To check this, we have used some kind of
rolling regressions technique, using every time only 60 observations. We started with the first 60 countries. In the
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next regression the first country was excluded, whereas country 61 was added, etc. This has been done for all
possible specifications as used in the sensitivity analysis outlined above. Our basic finding is that the coefficient
of the change in economic freedom is quite stable and that, therefore, there are no indications that our sample
choice may have influenced our basic findings. Figure 1 shows the estimated coefficients in case we use Ie as
indicator for economic freedom. It is clear that in all regressions the coefficient is significantly different from
zero. Similar results were found for the other indicators (not shown).
[Insert figure 1]  
An alternative approach to examine the robustness of empirical relationships has recently been suggested by
Sala-i-Martin (1997). According to this author the test applied in the extreme bound analysis is too strong for any
variable to really pass it: if the distribution of the estimators has some positive and some negative support, then
one is bound to find one regression for which the estimated coefficient changes signs if enough regressions are
run. Instead of analyzing the extreme bounds of the estimates of the coefficient of a particular variable, Sala-i-
Martin has analyzed the entire distribution. He concludes that the picture emerging from the empirical growth
literature is not the pessimistic "Nothing is Robust" that we get with the extreme bound analysis. Instead, he
finds that a substantial number of variables can be found to be strongly related to growth. This approach can, of
course, also be applied to the relationship between economic freedom and economic growth. 
Apart from the variables in the Z-vector as outlined above, we have used a number of variables from
the Barro-Lee data set, which are all explained in more detail in the Appendix. All possible combinations of up
to three of these variables were added to the explanatory variables in the base regression. This gave a total of
2952 regressions. The White t-values of the economic freedom indicator Ie are shown in figures 2 (level in 1975)
and 3 (change between 1975-90). It follows from these figures that generally only the coefficients of the change
in economic freedom are significantly different from zero. Similar results are found for Is1 and Is2 (not shown). 
[insert figures 2-3]
An interesting issue is whether economic freedom affects economic growth through stimulating investment or
human capital. In that case the results reported in tables 6-8 may be biased, since investment and human capital
are included as explanatory variables in the basic model. Therefore, we have followed the same procedure as
outlined in the previous section. In the M vector for the base model for investment spending two variables are
included: the secondary school enrollment rate in 1975 (SEC ), and the average share of export and import to75
GDP over the period 1975-1990 (OPEN). Levine and Renelt (1992) conclude that export is robustly related with
investment. The variables included in the Z-vector are: GOV, POP, YCAP and INF. It followed that the
coefficients for the level of economic freedom in 1975 were generally not significant (not shown). Table 9 shows
the outcomes of the sensitivity analysis for the change in economic freedom.  Again there is no evidence for a11
robust relationship. This is an interesting outcome for two reasons. First, it implies that the results in table 7 were
not biased due to the inclusion of investment as explanatory variable. Second, it is often argued that economic
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freedom will stimulate investment. Our results do not support that claim.
We have also performed this type of sensitivity analysis for secondary school enrollment rate in 1985
(Sec85). Our M-vector includes Prim  (the primary school enrollment rate in 1975). This variable is included as75
primary schooling is a prerequisite for secondary schooling and hence it can be expected that the level of
secondary school enrollment is partly determined by previous primary school enrollment figures. We do not find
a robust relationship between secondary school enrollment and economic freedom (not shown).
Table 9 Sensitivity Results for Fraser Institute Indices for Increase in the Level of Freedom 1975-90 (Dep-
endent Variable: Investment as share of GDP, 1975-1990)





high  9.14  2.10 0.55 YCAP
base  8.42  1.54 0.36  
low  0.17  0.04 0.54 GOV, POP, INF
Is1 fragile
high  8.19  1.65 0.54 YCAP, POP   
base  6.62  1.19 0.36
low -1.14 -0.24 0.54 GOV, INF, POP
Is2 fragile 
high                       
base 10.40  2.21 0.38
low  3.38  0.84 0.54 GOV, INF, POP
6. Concluding comments
As follows from the citation of Milton Friedman at the beginning of this paper, it is often maintained that
economic freedom may further high levels of economic growth. Recently, a number of indicators for economic
freedom have become available, which make it possible to test this view. The purpose of this paper was twofold.
First, a thorough comparison and evaluation of these indicators, and second, a careful analysis to examine
whether there is indeed a close and robust relationship between these measures of economic freedom and
economic growth. In the paper we focus on the indicators of The Heritage Foundation/Wall Street Journal and of
the Fraser Institute. It is concluded that although these measures differ somewhat in their coverage, they show
similar rankings for the countries covered. Some elements in these measures are, however, questionable.
Especially the way government spending and taxes are taken up may be questioned. Nevertheless, we have used
the various indicators of the Fraser Institute in empirical growth models, following both the so-called extreme
bound analysis and the variant thereof as suggested by Sala-i-Martin (1997). The models are estimated for the
period 1975-90 for 80 countries, using both the level of economic freedom in 1975 and the change in freedom
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between 1975-90 as explanatory variables. Our main conclusion is that more economic freedom fosters
economic growth, but that the level of freedom is not related to growth. In other words, our findings imply that
more economic freedom will bring countries more quickly to their steady state level of economic growth (if they
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Penn World Table (Mark 5.6a)
GDP Log of Real GDP per capita (1985 international prices; Laspeyres Index)
GRGDP Average GDP growth
INVSH Real Gross Domestic Investment (private and public) (% of GDP; 1985 international
prices)
POP Population
GRPOP Average Population growth
CSH Real Consumption (% of GDP; 1985 international prices)
GSH Real Government (public consumption) (% of GDP; 1985 international prices)
GRP Average growth rate of GDP deflator
OPENSH Openness (exports+imports)/GDP (current international prices)
Barro-Lee data
SECSCH Percentage of "secondary school attained" in the total pop.
PRISCH Percentage of "primary school attained" in the total pop.
HIGHSCH Percentage of "higher school attained" in the total pop.
PRIGHTS Index of political rights (from 1 to 7; 1=most freedom), Source: GASTIL
PR7289 PRIGHTS over 1972-1989
CIVLIB Index of civil liberties (from 1 to 7; 1=most freedom), Source: GASTIL
CL7289 CIVLIB over 1972-1989
AREA Size of land, million squares Km.
DIST Average distance to capitals of world 20 major exporters, weighted by values of
bilateral imports, 1000 km.
OWTI Own-import weighted non-tariff frequency on intermediate inputs and capital goods
FREEOP Measure of "Free trade openness" (=.528-.26lnAREA-.095lnDIST)
FREETAR Measure of tariff restriction (FREEOP*ln(1+OWTI)
BMP Black market premium
BMPL log(BMP)
LLY Ratio of liquid liabilities to GDP
ASSASS Number of assassinations per million population per year (1975-1985)
COUP Number of coups per year (1975-1985)
REVOL Number of revolutions per year (1975-1985)
TOT Terms of trade shock (growth rate of export prices minus growth rate of import prices)
(1975-1985)
WARDUM Dummy for countries that participated in at least on external war over the period, 1960
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-85
WARTIME The fraction of time over 1960-85 involved in external war
Table A1 shows the countries in our sample and the scores of various freedom indicators (1975), whereas table
A2 shows the increase in economic freedom. Source: Gwartney et al. (1996).
Table A1. Economic Freedom indicators, 1975.
Country Is1 Is1 Is2 Is2 Ie Iec c c
ALGERIA 3.5 2.4 3.0 2.4 3.6 2.8 
ARGENTINA 3.1 2.6 3.1 3.6 3.1 3.0 
AUSTRALIA 5.0 5.8 6.1 6.1 5.4 5.8 
AUSTRIA 4.6 6.2 4.9 5.3 4.8 5.8 
BANGLADESH 3.5 1.9 2.5 1.8 3.3 1.9 
BELGIUM 5.5 8.7 7.3 8.6 6.2 8.4 
BENIN 3.8 2.7 3.0 2.5 3.5 2.6 
BOLIVIA 5.5 4.8 4.9 5.6 5.3 5.3 
BRAZIL 3.2 2.3 2.0 2.0 2.8 2.3 
CAMEROON 4.7 2.6 3.3 2.5 4.2 2.6 
CANADA 6.1 7.5 7.5 7.8 6.5 7.4 
CHILE 2.8 3.7 2.5 3.3 2.8 3.5 
COLOMBIA 4.3 2.6 2.6 2.4 3.7 2.7 
CONGO 4.5 4.1 4.2 3.4 4.5 4.0 
COSTA RICA 5.2 5.2 5.6 5.7 5.3 5.4 
CYPRUS 3.9 4.1 3.6 3.5 3.8 4.0 
DENMARK 3.8 5.8 4.3 4.9 4.1 5.4 
DOMINICAN REP. 3.6 2.3 2.7 2.3 3.4 2.4 
ECUADOR 4.3 4.6 4.6 5.3 4.4 4.9 
EGYPT 2.4 3.6 3.0 3.4 2.7 3.8 
EL SALVADOR 4.7 3.8 3.6 3.5 4.3 3.8 
FIJI 4.6 3.4 3.6 3.1 4.1 3.1 
FINLAND 3.9 5.6 4.0 4.9 4.0 5.2 
FRANCE 4.3 5.6 4.4 4.7 4.4 5.3 
GERMANY, WEST 5.9 8.6 7.3 8.5 6.4 8.4 
GHANA 2.5 0.5 1.3 0.4 2.1 0.5 
GREECE 3.9 4.1 3.2 3.5 3.7 3.7 
GUATEMALA 6.5 4.9 5.3 5.3 5.9 5.0 
HONDURAS 7.4 6.3 6.8 6.6 7.1 6.4 
HONG KONG 9.2 9.1 9.0 9.3 9.0 9.0 
HUNGARY 3.0 2.3 2.1 2.2 3.1 2.8 
ICELAND 2.7 2.0 2.4 1.9 2.6 2.0 
INDIA 3.3 1.6 2.3 1.4 3.0 1.3 
INDONESIA 5.2 4.9 4.6 5.3 5.0 5.1 
IRAN 5.0 6.2 4.8 5.5 4.9 6.0 
IRELAND 3.9 5.1 4.6 4.4 4.2 4.6 
ISRAEL 2.1 2.7 2.3 2.6 2.2 2.7 
ITALY 4.1 4.6 3.6 3.8 4.0 4.3 
JAMAICA 3.2 2.8 2.8 2.3 3.0 2.5 
JAPAN 5.2 6.1 5.3 5.4 5.3 5.6 
JORDAN 4.2 4.6 4.4 4.3 4.3 4.7 
KENYA 3.4 3.4 3.9 3.1 3.8 3.5 
KOREA, REP. 4.3 4.1 3.2 3.7 4.0 4.0 
MALAWI 4.3 3.5 3.4 3.0 4.1 3.5 
MALAYSIA 5.2 5.4 5.9 5.8 5.4 5.5 
MALI 4.4 2.7 3.2 2.6 4.0 2.8 
MAURITIUS 3.9 2.8 3.1 2.7 3.7 2.9 
MEXICO 5.0 4.6 4.5 4.8 4.8 4.3 
NETHERLANDS 5.7 8.2 7.1 8.1 6.3 8.1 
NEW ZEALAND 4.3 5.2 4.6 4.5 4.5 4.9 
NICARAGUA 6.4 5.4 5.5 5.9 6.0 5.6 
NORWAY 3.6 5.3 3.8 4.4 3.8 5.1 
PAKISTAN 2.9 1.9 2.6 1.8 3.0 1.9 
PANAMA 7.0 8.4 8.2 8.6 7.3 8.3 
PARAGUAY 5.6 5.0 5.0 5.7 5.3 5.2 
PERU 3.7 2.1 2.1 2.0 3.1 2.2 
PHILIPPINES 4.6 3.0 3.6 3.1 4.4 3.3 
PORTUGAL 2.2 2.4 1.8 1.9 2.3 2.4 
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RWANDA 3.8 1.5 2.5 1.6 3.1 1.6 
SENEGAL 4.3 3.2 3.0 3.0 3.8 3.3 
SIERRA LEONE 4.2 2.1 2.9 2.1 3.8 2.3 
SINGAPORE 6.8 7.1 5.9 6.4 6.5 6.8 
SOUTH AFRICA 3.9 4.6 3.7 4.0 4.1 4.6 
SPAIN 3.9 3.8 3.0 3.3 3.6 3.5 
SRI LANKA 3.6 1.5 2.8 1.4 3.6 1.7 
SWEDEN 3.5 5.7 4.3 4.9 3.9 5.3 
SWITZERLAND 7.1 7.4 7.2 7.5 7.1 7.4 
SYRIA 3.7 4.6 4.5 5.3 3.9 4.9 
TAIWAN 4.9 5.3 4.8 5.6 4.9 5.5 
THAILAND 4.9 3.7 3.7 3.4 4.6 3.6 
TOGO 3.2 2.9 2.7 2.6 3.1 2.8 
TRINIDAD&TOBAGO 3.2 2.1 2.3 1.6 2.9 1.9 
TUNISIA 3.4 1.9 1.9 1.8 2.9 2.0 
TURKEY 2.8 2.0 1.9 1.9 2.5 2.0 
U.K. 5.0 5.1 4.7 4.3 4.7 4.7 
U.S.A. 6.0 8.5 7.9 8.4 6.6 8.1 
UGANDA 1.2 0.4 1.3 0.5 1.2 0.5 
URUGUAY 5.8 6.5 6.2 6.6 5.7 6.0 
VENEZUELA 6.9 6.9 6.3 7.2 6.4 6.7 
ZAMBIA 2.9 2.8 3.0 2.5 3.1 3.0 
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Table A2. Change in economic freedom, 1975-90
Country Is1 Is1 Is2 Is2 Ie Iec c c
ALGERIA -0.8 -0.3 -0.4 -0.3 -0.7 -0.5 
ARGENTINA 0.7 0.3 0.1 -0.2 0.3 -0.2 
AUSTRALIA 1.0 2.0 1.2 1.8 1.1 2.0 
AUSTRIA 0.8 1.3 1.8 2.0 1.2 1.7 
BANGLADESH 0.3 0.6 1.1 0.8 0.7 0.8 
BELGIUM 0.4 -0.3 0.2 -0.3 0.5 -0.1 
BENIN 0.6 1.1 0.8 0.9 0.8 1.1 
BOLIVIA 0.8 1.1 0.6 0.4 0.5 0.7 
BRAZIL -0.3 -0.7 -0.6 -0.9 -0.7 -1.0 
CAMEROON -0.2 0.9 0.6 0.6 0.2 0.8 
CANADA 0.8 1.2 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.3 
CHILE 2.9 3.6 3.8 4.2 3.3 3.9 
COLOMBIA 0.5 1.2 0.9 1.2 0.7 1.2 
CONGO -1.2 -1.9 -1.1 -1.3 -1.1 -1.6 
COSTA RICA 1.4 1.6 1.5 1.5 1.2 1.5 
CYPRUS -0.1 -0.0 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1 
DENMARK 0.8 1.8 2.1 2.5 1.3 2.1 
DOMINICAN REP. 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.0 
ECUADOR 0.6 0.1 -0.3 -0.5 0.2 -0.3 
EGYPT 1.8 1.1 1.7 1.6 2.0 1.3 
EL SALVADOR -0.4 -0.1 -0.5 -0.2 -0.3 -0.2 
FIJI 0.7 1.7 1.2 1.7 1.1 1.9 
FINLAND 0.9 1.7 2.3 2.3 1.5 2.0 
FRANCE 1.2 2.3 2.6 3.0 1.8 2.5 
GERMANY, WEST 0.4 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.7 
GHANA 1.1 1.7 1.3 1.7 1.2 1.7 
GREECE -0.5 0.5 0.3 0.4 -0.2 0.7 
GUATEMALA 0.1 1.6 0.7 1.3 0.4 1.4 
HONDURAS -1.4 0.1 -1.1 0.1 -1.2 0.1 
HONG KONG 0.1 0.4 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.5 
HUNGARY 0.0 1.0 0.6 0.6 0.0 0.4 
ICELAND 2.0 3.4 3.0 3.7 2.2 3.4 
INDIA 0.4 1.2 1.0 1.3 0.7 1.6 
INDONESIA 1.4 1.7 1.4 1.4 1.5 1.7 
IRAN -1.8 -3.0 -1.8 -1.8 -1.7 -2.4 
IRELAND 1.1 0.9 1.1 1.0 1.3 1.3 
ISRAEL 0.9 1.1 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 
ITALY 1.3 2.7 2.8 3.2 1.9 2.9 
JAMAICA 2.0 0.6 1.0 1.0 1.7 1.0 
JAPAN 1.7 2.0 2.6 2.7 2.1 2.4 
JORDAN 0.2 -0.8 -0.3 -0.7 -0.1 -0.8 
KENYA 1.1 0.6 0.1 0.7 0.6 0.7 
KOREA, REP. 0.9 0.8 1.3 0.9 1.1 0.8 
MALAWI -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.3 -0.3 
MALAYSIA 1.9 1.7 1.5 1.6 1.9 1.8 
MALI 1.0 1.7 0.8 1.3 0.9 1.6 
MAURITIUS 1.7 1.8 1.7 1.8 1.7 1.8 
MEXICO 0.3 0.8 0.3 0.6 0.3 1.0 
NETHERLANDS 0.1 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.4 0.6 
NEW ZEALAND 1.7 2.3 2.6 3.1 1.9 2.6 
NICARAGUA -4.4 -3.5 -4.4 -4.5 -4.5 -3.9 
NORWAY 1.2 2.0 2.3 2.8 1.5 2.1 
PAKISTAN 1.3 1.9 1.7 2.1 1.5 2.2 
PANAMA -0.7 -1.2 -0.7 -1.2 -0.6 -1.1 
PARAGUAY 0.8 1.0 0.6 0.6 0.8 0.9 
PERU 0.3 0.9 0.3 0.6 0.3 0.6 
PHILIPPINES 1.1 1.2 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.0 
PORTUGAL 1.9 2.6 2.1 2.3 1.8 2.4 
RWANDA 0.9 1.2 1.6 1.2 1.5 1.3 
SENEGAL 0.0 0.8 1.0 0.8 0.5 0.8 
SIERRA LEONE -0.3 -0.1 -0.7 -0.4 -0.6 -0.5 
SINGAPORE 1.7 2.0 2.6 2.8 2.0 2.4 
SOUTH AFRICA 0.7 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.3 0.4 
SPAIN 0.8 2.4 1.7 2.2 1.2 2.4 
SRI LANKA 0.6 1.5 0.6 1.5 0.6 1.5 
SWEDEN 1.0 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.3 1.6 
SWITZERLAND 0.2 1.3 1.0 1.2 0.6 1.2 
SYRIA -0.5 -1.2 -1.9 -2.4 -0.7 -1.4 
TAIWAN 1.0 2.1 1.6 1.7 1.2 1.9 
THAILAND 1.4 2.6 1.8 2.5 1.6 2.7 
TOGO 0.6 0.4 0.9 0.6 0.8 0.6 
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TRINIDAD&TOBAGO 1.1 0.9 1.2 0.8 1.1 0.9 
TUNISIA 0.9 2.2 2.4 2.3 1.6 2.2 
TURKEY 1.8 3.0 2.5 3.2 2.0 2.9 
U.K. 1.6 3.7 3.1 4.3 2.3 3.9 
U.S.A. 1.4 0.3 0.8 0.3 1.2 0.5 
UGANDA 1.3 0.4 0.2 0.3 1.0 0.2 
URUGUAY 0.5 -0.0 0.3 0.0 0.4 0.3 
VENEZUELA -1.4 -1.3 -1.3 -1.7 -1.2 -1.4 
ZAMBIA -1.1 -1.0 -1.2 -1.0 -1.2 -1.2 
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1. This definition goes further than the one by Holmes et al. (1998): "absence of government coercion or
constraint on the production, distribution or consumption of goods and services" as it also includes secure
property rights. The definition of Gwartney et al. is very much influenced by the work of Rabushka. See, for
instance, Rabushka (1991a,b).
2. Apart from the definition issue, there is, of course also the question about the sequential relationship between
economic and political freedom. According to Friedman (1962), history suggests that capitalism is a necessary
condition for political freedom, but not a sufficient one. Others have different views on this issue, that will not be
dealt with in the present paper.
3. Previous attempts to construct indicators for economic freedom include: Spindler and Still (1991) and Scully
and Slottje (1991). Knack and Keefer (1995) provide information on many aspects included in the indicators
discussed below, including: risk of contract repudiation, risk of expropriation, corruption, and rule of law.
4. Gwartney et al. (1996) argue that, as government expenditures increase, more and more of these expenditures
tend to be channelled toward activities outside of the protective and productive functions of government.
5. Non-parametric correlation is more robust than linear correlation, more resistant to unplanned defects in the
data, in the same sense that the median is more robust than the mean (Press et al., 1986). Kendall’s correlation
coefficient is more parametric than that of Spearman. Since the first uses a ‘weaker’ property of the data there
can be applications in which r  is more robust than r ; however, since it throws away information that is availablek s
to r , there can also be applications where r  is less powerful than r . As both statistics are in general use, wes k s
apply both.
6. The first three rows (the comparison of the indicators from the Fraser-institute) refer to a sample of 102
countries; the comparison reported in the final row and column refers to 79 countries.
7. See also De Haan and Siermann (1995; 1996) who applied this approach to examine the effect of political and
civil freedoms on economic growth. Although very popular, the extreme bound analysis has not been without its
critics (see e.g. Pagan, 1987).
8. An alternative, of course, is to recalculate the indicators for economic freedom, leaving suspect items aside.
This approach is also followed. 
9. The t-statistics are: 0.25, -0.48, and -0.13.
10. The scores for the freedom indicators used are shown in the appendix.
11. In one case the base regression had the highest coefficient so that the cells in the row "high" are empty. 
Notes
